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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to present a new theory of the cartel party. My argument is 
straightforward. Assuming that parties are the political analog of firms, that party systems are 
the political analog of markets, that the shares of the electorate are the political analog of the 
market shares that firms control, Western European party systems share with oligopolistic 
markets some structural features. Yet, to know whether Western European party systems 
resemble oligopolistic markets, we need to know whether Western European party systems 
are non-competitive political markets exactly in the same way in which oligopolistic markets 
are not competitive. That is we need to know whether changes in (political) supply are 
competitive adaptations to changes in demand or not. Hence, to focus on supply is not 
enough. We need to look at changes in supply relative to changes in demand. Moreover, since 
voters’ perception of parties’ political offer to the electorate does not simply reflect some 
objective conditions but is instead mediated by subjective factors (preferences, expectations, 
ideas, and so on…) I further suggest that the perception of the cartel may not be determined 
by parties’ objectively oligopolistic practices, but it can simply be based on the perception of 
oligopolistic behavior, that is on the gap between the electorate’s demands and the market’s 
perceived supply. 
 The paper is divided into three parts. Part One discusses how my subjective approach 
can be used to assess whether Western European party systems resemble the functioning of 
oligopolistic markets.  Building upon the existing cartel party literature, I argue that in order 
to describe Western European party systems as oligopolistic political markets, it is necessary 
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to show not only that there are some structural similarities between Western European party 
systems and oligopolistic markets, but also that the political offer of Western European party 
systems does not adjust to changes in demand in the same way in which changes in supply are 
not (competitive) adaptations to changes in demand in oligopolistic markets. In this part I also 
argue how my subjective approach can be used to assess whether political supply is adjusting 
to changes in political demands or not. Part Two presents some evidence consistent with the 
notion of oligopolistic political markets. The results of the survey data analyses presented in 
this  part of the paper reveals that there is an increasing gap between the position of the 
electorate and that of the party system in each of the countries under study. Part Three 
discusses some of the possible implications of this research and suggests that the 1990s are 
the ‘age of the cartel party’. 
 
Part One: A Subjective Approach to the Study of Oligopolistic Political Markets 
Oligopoly and the Market 
When supply and price adjust to changes in demand, a market is defined as competitive. By 
contrast, non-competitive markets are those markets in which supply and price are not 
affected by changes in demand. When a non-competitive market is characterized by the 
presence of one seller and entry barriers, the non-competitive market is defined as monopoly1. 
On the contrary, a non-competitive market is defined as oligopoly when there is a limited 
number of firms operating in the market; when each of these firms controls a considerable 
                                                          
1 According to Cozzi and Zamagni “there are many (…) factors that can explain the emergence and the 
consolidation of these (entry) barriers. One of these factors is the control of one or more of the raw materials that 
are needed to produce the good under consideration; another is the exclusive knowledge of a given productive 
technique; another one is the availability of patents concerning one product or new productive processes and so 
on”. See Terenzio Cozzi and Stefano Zamagni, Economia politica, Bologna, il Mulino, 1989, p. 377.  
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portion of the market, so that from 40 to 100 per cent of the market is controlled by 2 to 10 
firms; and when none of these firms can ignore or act independently of what the other firms 
do2. Oligopolistic markets display two major peculiarities. The first is that the risks associated 
with the price fluctuations that can be observed in a competitive market are eliminated, 
because prices are fixed by the oligopolistic firms themselves either directly or through the 
manipulation of the quantities supplied. The second peculiarity of this oligopolistic market is 
that by eliminating the risks associated with competition, it promises and (is expected to 
protect) the survival of all of the oligopolistic firms themselves.  
 
Oligopoly in the Political Market 
Do Western European party systems resemble these oligopolistic markets? In order to answer 
this question we need to assess whether Western European party systems actually display the 
same dynamics that we can observe in oligopolistic markets. And in order to do so, we need 
to assess whether they satisfy the three conditions mentioned above. 
The first two conditions are easily met. As Blyth and Katz recently pointed out 
Western European party systems are characterized by a relatively small number of effective 
parties and that these relatively few parties control nearly the totality of the parliamentary 
seats3. But how do we know whether these relatively few parties distort competition? The 
cartel party literature has elaborated three different, but not mutually exclusive, answers. 
 
                                                          
2 Cozzi and Zamagni, op. cit., p. 90 and p. 377. 
3 Mark Blyth and Richard S. Katz, “From Catch-all-icism to Reformation: The Political Economy of the Cartel 
Party”, European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, March 2001. A 
revised version of the article can be found in Mark Blyth, “The Political economy of Political Parties: Beyond 
the Catch-all-ic Church?”, Paper Prepared for the 2002 Meeting of the Council of European Studies, Chicago, 
14-17 March (2002). 
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The Systemic Approach 
For Katz and Mair, the distortion of competition is due to the fact that “party programmes 
become more similar, and (…) campaigns are in any case oriented more towards agreed goals 
rather than contentious means”4.  The second answer, elaborated by Blyth and Katz, argues 
instead that parties distort competition by fixing the political analog of market quantities, that 
is by constraining the set of viable (mostly economic) policy options5. In both arguments, the 
cartelization of parties and party systems is associated with an observable phenomenon, that is 
the increasing similarity of parties’ programs and the narrowing of viable policies. Both 
arguments postulate the existence of a cartel of parties at the systemic level and they will be 
referred to as to ‘systemic’ conceptions of the cartel of parties. Instructive as they may be, 
both versions of the ‘systemic’ cartel party hypothesis are inherently unable to show whether 
the patterns of inter-party competition, or party systems, have come to resemble the 
functioning of oligopolistic markets6.  By assuming that party programs and policies are the 
political analog of supply, changes in party programs or policies simply indicate that there has 
been a change in supply in the political market. But a change in supply is per sé insufficient to 
say that the competition in the political market is distorted. In order to show that the 
functioning of political market is distorted, it is necessary to show that the observed changes 
in supply are not adjustments to corresponding changes in demand. Hence, the ‘systemic’ 
                                                          
4 Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party”, op. cit., p. 22. 
5 Mark Blyth and Richard S. Katz, “From Catch-all-icism to Reformation: The Political Economy of the Cartel 
Party”, European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions of Workshops, Grenoble, March 2001. 
6 The idea that a party system results from the patterns of inter-party competition was developed by Giovanni 
Sartori, who argued that “Parties make for a “system”, then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party 
system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition. That is, the system in 
question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical 
sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties”, see Giovanni Sartori, 
Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 44.  
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conception of the cartel party hypothesis is unable to provide any conclusive evidence as to 
whether Western European party systems have cartelized or not. 
In fact, one could very well argue against the ‘systemic’ conception of the cartel party 
hypothesis that changes in political supply are actually competitive adjustments to changes in 
political demand. Kitschelt, for example, argued that in the course of the past three decades 
voters’ political preferences and political distribution have changed7. Specifically, he argued 
that “the main axis of voter distribution (has shifted) from a simple alternative between 
socialist (left) and capitalist (right) politics to a more complex configuration opposing left-
libertarian and right-authoritarian alternatives”8. According to Kitschelt this change in voters’ 
preferences and distribution (in the political space) reflected a change in political demands 
and parties’ (and governments’) were forced to change their political supply to adapt to the 
electoral market’s new demands. If this were the case, then there would not be any distortion 
of political competition and, hence, no similarity with oligopolistic practices. As will become 
clear later on in the paper, I do not share this view and I will explain under why it is legitimate 
to say that Western European party systems resemble the functioning of oligopolistic markets. 
This said, I do agree with Kitschelt on the importance of investigating changes in supply 
relative to changes in demand.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, pp. 30-31. 
8 Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
 5
The systemic-subjective approach 
Having recognized the limits of the ‘systemic’ approach to the study of the cartel,  Kitschelt 
advanced what could be considered a “systemic-subjective” conception of the cartel9. This 
conception of the cartel differs from the previous in one major respect. The existence of the 
cartel is subjective and not objective. The cartel exists in voters’ perceptions but not 
necessarily in the real world. According to Kitschelt this perception is generated by the fact 
that when Social Democratic and Moderately Conservative parties, in their attempt to 
maximize their electoral returns, converge toward the median voter position, their political 
offers become increasingly distant from what these polarized voters demand of the political 
system. Hence, the political offers of the system parties become increasingly unable to satisfy 
their demands. 
By bringing subjectivity back in, Kitschelt made an important contribution to further 
our understanding of whether, why and to what extent party politics may resemble the 
functioning of oligopolistic markets. However, his approach is not entirely satisfactory. 
Kitschelt is right in suggesting that the nature of the cartel is subjective, that is the cartel 
exists in the perception of the voters. Yet, his argument becomes less convincing when he 
argues that the perception of the cartel is generated by some clearly identifiable systemic 
factors, such as the system parties’ centripetal convergence.  
 Kitschelt’s systemic-subjective approach is in fact vitiated by some major problems. 
To say that the cartellization has an objective nature and that the object is parties’ centripetal 
convergence amounts to assuming that party systems are or can be represented in a uni-
dimensional space, that parties’ positions can be located on this dimension (and, hence, can be 
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measured) and that voters are able to assess parties’ objective changes of position on this 
dimension. Unfortunately, none of these assumptions is particularly sound. It is, in fact, not at 
all clear whether party systems are actually uni-dimensional or can be represented in a uni-
dimensional space nor is it clear how parties can objectively be located in such a uni-
dimensional space. And if it is not possible to measure parties’ positions objectively, then it is 
not possible objectively to measure their centripetal convergence.  
Political scientists have developed several methods to estimate parties’ positions. 
Parties’ positions have been estimated on the basis of a priori judgements, mass surveys, 
expert surveys, elite studies and party manifestoes10. Four of these five solutions provide at 
best a subjective assessment of parties’ positions. By contrast, the left-right scores estimated 
by applying the Laver/Budge methodology to the party manifesto data do provide an objective 
assessment of parties’ positions. Unfortunately these estimates do not provide reliable 
evidence as to where parties are located and, thus, cannot be used to assess whether parties 
have converged centripetally or not11. In sum, in spite of all the attention that the problem has 
received, measuring parties’ objective location in the uni-dimensional space represents a 
problem for which the scholarly literature has been unable to find an adequate solution. It is, 
therefore, dubious that the voters have been more successful than party politics experts in 
assessing parties’ objective positions and their changes. This problem has an obvious 
implication. If there is no objective measure of parties’ centripetal convergence, then it is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1995, 
p. 17. 
10 For a discussion see Peter Mair, “Searching for the positions of political actors: a review of approaches and a 
critical evaluation of expert surveys”, in Michael Laver (ed.), Estimating the Policy Position of Political Actors, 
London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 10-30.  
11 Riccardo Pelizzo, “Party Positions or Party Direction? An Analysis of Party Manifesto Data”, 
West European Politics, vol. 26, n. 2, April 2003, pp. 67-89. 
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possible to claim that voters’ (subjective) perception of the cartel reflects parties’ (objective) 
convergence toward the center—because this centripetal converge cannot be measured 
‘objectively’.  
 Even more problematic is the claim that voters’ perception of parties’ cartellization is 
directly generated by objective or systemic factors. This claim is problematic because it 
assumes that the role that the human mind plays in the cognitive process is a passive one. The 
human mind, according to this view, simply records changes occurring around the subject. 
Yet, this assumption is at odds with some of the most reliable findings in the study of 
perception, namely that the human mind plays a considerably active role in the cognitive 
process and that the perception of the surrounding world is always mediated by, broadly 
speaking, subjective factors.  
Perception is not simply the work of senses but it always involves a mental decision. 
In fact, by establishing what is relevant and what is not, the mind instructs our senses about 
what to see12. According to Gregory “perception involves going beyond the immediately 
given evidence of the senses: this evidence is assessed on many grounds and generally we 
make the best bet, and we see things more or less correctly. But the senses do not give us a 
picture of the world directly; rather they provide evidence for the checking of hypotheses 
                                                          
12 This is true not only in the case of human beings but also in the case of animals. Popper’s example in this case 
is quite telling: “The frog is programmed for the highly specialized task of catching moving flies. The frog’s eye 
does not even signal to its brain a fly within reach if it does not move…in general, an animal will perceive what 
is relevant according to its problem situation; and its problem situation, in turn, will depend not only on its 
external situation, but upon its inner state: its programme, as given by its genetic constitution, and its many sub-
programmes – its preferences and choices”, Karl R. Popper in Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and 
Its Brain, New York, Springer International, 1977, p. 92.   
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about what lies before us…we may say that the perception of an object is an hypothesis 
suggested and tested by the sensory data…perceiving and thinking are not independent”13.  
In our daily life, we are generally unaware of the fact that the mind affects our 
perception by formulating hypotheses “about what lies before us”. The role of the mind is 
quite clearly illustrated by the following examples. Sometimes, when we sit in the train, we 
look out of the window at the other trains in the station. We check our watch and we realize 
that it is time to go. We look again outside the window and we see that the train next to ours is 
moving. Yet, after some time we realize that we experienced an illusory movement. The other 
train did not move, our train did. Why did we experience such an illusion? Because 
“whenever there is movement the brain has to decide what is moving and what is stationary” 
and in our case the brain, incorrectly, hypothesized that our position was stationary and the 
other train was moving14.  
In other words, our perception, our vision reflects not only the external, objective 
situation but also the observer’s inner state, our preferences and choices15. In fact, “the seeing 
of objects involves many sources of information beyond those meeting the eye when we look 
at one object. It generally involves knowledge of the object derived from previous experience, 
and this experience is not limited to vision but may include the other senses; touch, taste, 
smell, hearing and perhaps also temperature or pain. Objects are far more than patterns of 
stimulation: objects have pasts and futures; when we know its past or can guess its future, an 
                                                          
13 The quote is taken Richard L. Gregory, Eye and Brain. The Psychology of seeing, New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1978 (3rd edition), pp. 13-14. This quote, as some of the following quotes from Gregory, uses the word ‘brain’ 
where Popper would use the word mind. On the relationship between mind and brain, and on the different ways 
in which this relationship has been theorized, see Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, op. 
cit. , pp. 3-99.  
14 Gregory, Eye and Brain, op. cit., p. 113. 
15 This point was more fully articulated by Popper and Eccles, The Self and Its Brain, op. cit., p. 92. 
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object transcends experience and becomes an embodiment of knowledge and expectation”16. 
Previous knowledge, ideas, expectations are what we can generally refer to as ‘subjective 
factors’. 
 
The Subjective Approach 
If psychologists and neuroscientists are right in claiming that perceptions are mediated by 
subjective factors and if we perceive politics in the same way in which we perceive any other 
phenomenon, then even our perception of politics and political phenomena is mediated by our 
subjectivity. This means that voters’ perception of the cartel does not reflect sic et simpliciter, 
some objective conditions such as parties’ centripetal convergence, but it reflects instead the 
way in which voters perceive parties’ movements in the political space. 
This is why, and in contrast to the systemic-subjective approach, I suggest that what 
we need in order to understand whether and to what extent voters may perceive that a party 
system functions like an oligopolistic market, is what I refer to as the ‘subjective approach’.  
My approach is ‘subjective’ because I argue that a party system is perceived to operate 
like an oligopolistic market (subjective) when the electorate perceives a gap between its 
demands and the party system’s perceived supply (subjective). The perception of this gap, in 
turn, may be due to the fact that the electorate’s demands have changed while political offer is 
perceived to have remained fixed. It may be due to the fact that demands have undergone 
dramatic changes while political offer is perceived to have changed little or, at least, not 
enough to satisfy the new demands. It may be due to the fact that the political offer has 
changed while demands have not. Or it may be due to the fact that demands and party 
                                                          
16 Gregory, Eye and Brain, op. cit., p.10. 
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system’s perceived offer have both changed but have changed in ways that make the gap 
between them seem wider. The adoption of my ‘subjective’ approach is crucial in this regard. 
By adopting the ‘subjective’ approach I am not only able to recognize the subjective nature of 
the gap between political demands and supply, but I am also able to investigate whether and 
to what extent the perception of the cartel is related to one of the above mentioned scenarios. 
My ‘subjective’ approach resembles Kitschelt’s approach in that we both argue that 
the cartel of parties (or cartel party system) exists only in voters’(subjective) mind. Yet, the 
‘subjective’ approach differs from the ‘systemic-subjective’ approach in two ways. First of 
all, in contrast to the ‘systemic-subjective’ approach, I argue that the perception of 
oligopolistic behavior of parties (and party systems) does not have to reflect parties’ 
objectively oligopolistic practices, but simply reflects the perception that the political offer of 
Western European party systems is increasingly inadequate to satisfy the electorate’s political 
demands. In other words, the perception of a cartel of parties reflects the gap between the 
electorate’s demands and what the electorate perceives to be the party system’s supply. 
Second, for Kitschelt, the perception of the cartelization is circumscribed to the voters 
located at the extremes of the political spectrum as I recalled above. The subjective approach 
allows one to explain why the perception of the cartellization may be found among voters 
other than those the voters located at the extremes of the political spectrum as well as why  
why the perception of cartellization may be associated with the transformations other than 
centripetal converge of the system parties or with the party system’s depolarization17.  
                                                          
17 The overall polarization of a party system is measured as the ideological distance between the left-most party 
and the right-most party in a given party system. Ideological distance is defined as “the overall spread of the 
ideological spectrum of any given polity”. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for 
Analysis, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 126.  
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In fact, the ‘subjective’ approach suggests that the electorate is not concerned about 
the political offer of any individual party, but is concerned instead with what I call the 
direction of competition. That is how well the electorate’s demands are satisfied by party 
system’s political offer.  
 
Part Two: Some Evidence 
The Cartel as the Absence of Differences 
Voters might perceive a cartel when the positions and proposals of the relevant parties are so 
similar that the voter is unable to see real alternatives in the political market. The perception 
of a cartel is quite pervasive among Western European voters. More than 23 per cent of the 
British voters surveyed by the British Election Study in 1997 did not detect any difference 
between the Labour and the Conservative party, almost 42 per cent  of the German voters 
surveyed by the German Election Study in 1998 did not think that parties’ differences were 
sufficiently marked to give voters a clear alternative, and more than 54 per cent of the French 
voters surveyed in 1997 declared that the proposals of the Left and those of the UDF-RPR 
coalition seemed neither completely nor somewhat different18. Data are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Even more interestingly, voters are increasingly unable to see differences between parties. As 
shown by the data reported in Table 2.1, the percentage of British voters who do not see any 
difference between the Labour and the Conservative party increased from 6.3 per cent in 1983 
                                                          
18 British voters were asked the following question “now considering everything the Conservative and Labour 
parties stand for, would you say that (there is great difference, some difference, not much difference); French 
voters were asked instead the following question: “do the proposals of the Left and the RPR-UDF majority seem 
(very different, somewhat different, not particularly different, not at all different); finally German voters were 
asked “do you agree with the following statement: parties differ so much (in their objectives) from each other, 
that the citizen has a clear choice). 
 12
to 23.4 per cent in 1997. Although the French and the German data do not allow me to 
construct similar time series, it is possible to bypass this problem by using differences 
between age groups as a surrogate for the time series19. Table 2.2 shows the percentage of 
each of three age groups reporting not seeing differences between parties20. Both the French 
and the German data show that there is a negative correlation between age and the percentage 
of voters who not seeing differences between parties. In sum, a large, and growing, 
percentage of Western European voters report that they see little difference between the 
various parties. These findings are of great importance for the purposes of the present work as 
they provide evidence consistent with the non-competitiveness of the Western European 
political markets and with the subjective version of the cartel hypothesis.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Why do parties seem so similar? There are three possible answers to this question depending 
on the approach that one adopts. For the ‘systemic’ approach, parties seem similar because 
they are similar and they are increasingly similar because of increasing objective similarities. 
For the ‘systemic-subjective’ parties seem similar because they are perceived as such and this 
perceived similarity reflects objective changes, such as the centripetal convergence. The third 
answer is that parties seem similar because the position of parties and the whole party system 
are perceived to have changed relative to the position of the electorate. 
 
 
                                                          
19 This solution is obviously far from being a perfect one. As Ingrid van Biezen sharply suggested to me, 
differences between age groups might be a product of socialization or political learning.  
20 Respondents were divided into three age groups: voters reporting to be under 30 years of age were assigned to 
the “young” category, voters reporting to be over 61 years of age were assigned to the category “old”, while all 
the voters in the 31-60 age groups were assigned to the category “middle age”. 
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Differences, Space, Distances 
The spatial representation of political differences provides an almost hegemonic analytical 
framework to both understand and explain party politics. Why is the spatial representation so 
important in the study of party politics? Because knowing where a party stands means 
knowing what it stands for and whether that is (morally) good or bad21. Therefore, knowing a 
party’s location on the left-right space provides not only cognitive guidance, but it also 
provides electoral guidance22. Voters placed left-to-center are more likely to vote for parties 
that are perceived to be located left-to-center than right-wing voters and, conversely self-
reported right-wingers are more likely to vote for right-wing parties than self-reported left-
wing voters. In a similar vein Huber and Inglehart underlined that “the language of ‘left’ and 
‘right’ captures a variety of salient issues that help citizens and elites alike make sense of the 
political landscape”. Meanwhile Dalton suggested that the spatial location is a sort of super 
issue, a synthetic indication of all that a voter or a party located in a certain place stands for23. 
In addition to these cognitive virtues, the spatial representation of politics has an additional 
advantage which is that it is highly comparable across countries because the terms “left” and 
“right” are empty signifiers, and they do not reflect (and obviously are not attached to) a 
specific essence24. 
                                                          
21 For a discussion of this point, see Norberto Bobbio, Destra e Sinistra. Ragioni e significati di una distinzione 
politica, Roma, Donzelli, 1994. 
22 For a different opinion, see Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 335. 
23 For an assessment of the importance of the spatial metaphor, see also John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, 
“Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies”, Party Politics, vol. 1, n. 1, 1995, pp. 
111-; see also Russell J. Dalton, Citizens Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Western 
Democracies, Chatham, Chatham House Publishers, 1996. 
24 The idea that the terms “left”and “right” are empty signifiers, that their are labels that can be “easily “loaded” 
and “reloaded”- for they lack any semantic substratum” was advanced by Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party 
Systems, op. cit., pp. 334-336. For a more recent criticism of an essentialist definition of the terms “left” and 
“right”, see Marco Tarchi, “Destra e sinistra: due essenze introvabili”, in Democrazia e Diritto, XXXIV, 1, 1994, 
pp. 381-396. The fact that ‘left’ and ‘right’are empty signifiers does not contradict the fact that the spatial 
 14
[Table 3 about here] 
If the percentage of voters who place themselves on the Left-Right continuum is, as Sani and 
Sartori suggested a proof of the intelligibility of the spatial representation of the political 
competition, then a majority of West European voters do understand the terms “Left” and 
“Right”25. The data presented in Table 3 show that from two thirds, as in the Italian case, to 
four fifths, as in the Dutch and British cases, are able to place themselves on the Left-Right 
scale and, according to Sani and Sartori, understand the meaning of this spatial representation.  
Are Voters’ Positions Fixed over Time? 
The data discussed so far suggest that voters place themselves on the Left-Right scale and that 
they actually understand the meaning of doing so, we can push our analysis a little bit further 
and ask whether voters’ distribution along the left-right continuum is stable over time or not 
and, if not, how did it change.  
 Before addressing these questions, let me briefly explain how I will measure voters’ 
positions on the left-right scale, whether their positions are fixed over time or whether they 
change. Both Eurobarometer surveys as well as German and Dutch elections surveys asked 
respondents to place themselves along the left-right scale. The left-right scale adopted by both 
the Eurobarometer and the Dutch Election surveys is a ten-point scale, where value 1 means 
‘left’ and value ‘10’ means ‘right’. The German election studies adopted instead an eleven-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
location is a sort of super-issue. The ‘left’ and ‘right’ terms are empty signifiers diachronically and cross-
country, while the spatial location is a super-issue synchronically. That is terms ‘left’and ‘right’ are per sé unable 
to tell us what they stand for sub specie aeternitatis, but they provide an indication of what a party stands for in a 
certain country at a certain time.   
25 Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, “Frammentazione, Polarizzazione e Cleavages: Democrazie Facili e 
Difficili”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, vol. VIII, n. 3, Dicembre 1978, pp. 339-361. A revised version of 
this paper can be found in Giovanni Sartori, Teoria dei Partiti e Caso Italiano, Milano, SugarCo, 1982, pp. 253-
290. An English version of this paper, see Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, “Polarisation, Fragmentation and 
Competition in Western Democracies” in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems, 
London, SAGE, 1983, pp. 307-340.  
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point scale, so that while ‘left’ is still associated with the value 1 in the scale, the term ‘right’ 
is now associated with value 11. On the basis of voters’ self-placement on the scale, I 
compute the mean or the average voter position, which I adopt as the indicator of where the 
electorate is located and shifts from that initial value provides evidence as to whether and to 
what extent the voters’ position changes over time. Specifically, an increase in the value of 
the average voter’s position means that electorate is reportedly moving right-ward, while a 
decline in the value of the average voter’s position denotes that the electorate is shifting left-
ward.   
With regard to the first question, the data show that voters’ self-reported distribution 
on the Left-Right continuum has changed from the early 1970s to the year 2000 in each of the 
West European countries under study. By analyzing the data provided by the Eurobarometer 
surveys from 1973 to year 2000, three patterns can be observed. In France and in the 
Netherlands, after an initial shift to the right, the position of the average voter has moved left-
ward in the period under study. In Germany and in the United Kingdom, the position of the 
average voter has moved left-ward as an almost linear function of time. In Italy, the position 
of the average voter has followed a steady right-ward trend. These transformations present a 
second element of interest. The Italian electorate, that was more left-ward oriented than the 
French, the German, the Dutch and British electorate in the early 1970s, is now the most 
right-ward oriented. The data are presented in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
If instead of using the data provided by the Eurobarometer surveys, I use the German 
Election Survey data and the Dutch Election Survey data, I reach the same conclusion, that is 
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that the electorate, in this case of these two countries only, reports to have shifted to left. The 
data are presented in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Are Parties’ Positions Fixed over Time? 
As was previously noted more than 23 % of British voters, more than 42% of the German 
voters and more than 54% of the French voters say that parties are not different. Does this 
mean that the distance between all the parties in a given party system has vanished? Does this 
mean that the distance between the relevant parties has vanished? Or does it mean something 
else? In order to answer these questions I will analyze two sets of survey data. One set of data 
is represented by the Post-European Election survey conducted in 1989 and in 1994 which 
provides data with regard to voters’ placement of French, German, Italian, Dutch and British 
parties. In addition to these data, I will also employ the data made available by the German 
election surveys conducted between 1976 and 1998 and the Dutch election surveys conducted 
from 1981 to 1997. These data allow me to construct time series and to see whether and to 
what extent voters’ perception of parties positions has changed over time and, more 
importantly, to assess whether these changes in party location have followed any particular 
pattern.  
The Eurobaromoter surveys on the one hand and the German and the Dutch election 
surveys on the other hand asked respondents to locate parties on the left-right scales. The 
scales are the same as the ones employed for voters’ left-right self-placement. On the basis of 
respondents’ answers, I compute each party system party’s position. This position is 
calculated by estimating the mean location for each party on the basis of all voters’ answers. 
As in the case of voters’ self-placement, the smaller the mean score that a party receives, the 
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more left the party is perceived to be. The greater the mean score, the more right-wing the 
party is perceived to be. Those parties that obtain the smallest and highest score are the parties 
that are perceived to represent the party system poles. By subtracting the score of the left-
most party from that of the right-most party, I compute the polarization of the whole party 
system. In the same way, it is possible to calculate the polarization of the relevant parties, that 
is parties whose existence affects the dynamics of inter-party competition and government 
formation. 
In addition to testing whether the ideological polarization of the whole party system 
and the distance between relevant parties have changed over time, I also test whether the 
Social-Democratic and Moderately Conservative parties have moved centripetally as Kitschelt 
suggested or not. Finally I test whether the average party’s position has changed and if so 
how. The average party’s position is very important because it indicates where the center of 
the party system is perceived to be so that changes in the average party’s position indicate 
whether and how the ideological connotation of the whole party system changes over time. 
Changes in the position of the average party provide information as to the changes in the 
direction of competition. 
Let me address the first question, that is whether the distance between all the party 
system parties has vanished. The answer is negative. Voters do locate different parties on 
different points on the left-right continuum. Moreover, if the distance between the parties 
located at the extreme poles of the party system is, as Sartori suggested, a proper indicator of 
polarization, then the Eurobarometer data display two different patterns. In the United 
Kingdom and in Germany, polarization of the whole party system has declined, while it has 
increased in France, Italy and in the Netherlands. The national election surveys present a 
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slightly different picture. In fact, the German Survey Election data indicate that the overall 
polarization of the German party system has increased from the mid-seventies onward, while 
the Dutch Election Surveys indicate that the Dutch party system has depolarized in the 1981-
1998 period.  
The fact that parties are still seen as different, which is why they are located on 
different points of the scale, is not consistent with the criticism of parties’ increasing 
similarity. Moreover, the fact that in three of the five countries under study (according to the 
Eurobarometer) the differences between all parties are perceived to actually have increased is 
also inconsistent with the claim that parties are too similar. Looking at these findings in the 
light of voters’ perception of parties’ excessive similarity creates an interesting paradox. How 
do we explain that parties which are perceived as different are criticized for not being 
different even when their differences have increased? This dilemma seems to have two 
plausible solutions. The first is that when voters complain about parties’ lack of differences 
they do not refer to all parties but they refer only to the relevant parties, that is to parties that 
because of coalitional or blackmail potential can affect both the nature of electoral 
competition and that of government policies. This solution of the dilemma is also consistent 
with the questions asked in the British and French national election studies. But there is also 
an alternative, which is that when voters denounce parties’ excessive similarity, they do not 
refer to changes in the distance between parties but they refer instead to the direction of 
competition. I will return to this point later on. The data concerning the ideological 
polarization of Western European party systems are presented in Table 6.  
[Table 6 about here] 
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The first solution of the above mentioned dilemma is clear. Voters criticize parties’ 
excessive similarity because relevant parties, but not necessarily all the party system parties, 
have become increasingly similar. This would also explain why, in spite of the perception of 
an increasing distance between the parties located at the extremes, parties are perceived as too 
similar. In short, when voters criticize “parties” they do not refer to “anti-party-system  
parties”. Moreover, if what voters observe is that the relevant parties are perceived to be 
increasingly similar, since relevant parties are generally the Social-Democratic and 
Moderately Conservative parties that alternate in government, then I would be able to support 
Kitschelt’ s claim that the distance between Social-Democratic and Moderately Conservative 
parties has vanished because they both converged centripetally.  
Before I can assess whether this is indeed the case, several other questions need to be 
addressed. In fact, to know whether the distance between Social-Democratic and Moderately 
Conservative parties has vanished or not, we need to know whether Social-Democratic and 
Moderately Conservative parties have ever been perceived as different or not. Have they ever 
been perceived as distant on the left-right scale? Did the distance between the Social 
Democratic and the Moderately Conservative parties decline as Kitschelt suggested ? If  inter-
party distance indicates that parties are different, then the Eurbarometer data show that Social-
Democratic parties and Moderately Conservative parties are (perceived as) different. 
Moreover, the Eurobarometer data also show that the ideological distance between Social-
Democratic parties and Moderately Conservative parties has declined in Germany, in the 
Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, while it has increased in France and in Italy26. 
                                                          
26 Only in 3 out of the 5 countries under study, the distance between social-democratic parties and moderately 
conservative parties has declined, that is in Germany, in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom. Only in the 
British and in the Dutch case, ideological distance has declined because of a simultaneous centripetal conversion 
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These findings reproduce the same dilemma we encountered with regard to the 
differences between all the party system parties, that there are differences and that these 
differences are sometimes perceived to have increased, and yet that voters perceive that there 
are no differences between coalitionable parties. Why? Because voters seem to be more 
concerned with the direction of competition, with whether the ideological make-up of the 
party system as a whole is shifting left-ward or right-ward than with the location of a single 
party, or with the distance between two relevant parties. The data are presented in Table 7. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Let me turn to whether the direction of competition has changed. What has generally 
been missed by those scholars who analyze party competition is that regardless of whether the 
distance between Social-Democratic and Moderately Conservative parties has declined or not, 
Social-Democratic parties have moved to the right almost everywhere. With only the 
exception of the French Socialist Party, the German, Italian, Dutch and British Social-
Democratic parties moved toward the center or rightward. The result of this centripetal or 
rather right-ward shift of the Social Democratic parties, combined with the fact that the 
Moderately Conservative parties have either remained in their previous position (as in the 
case of the German CDU) or have moved further right (as in the Italian case with the 
emergence Forza Italia which is perceived as a more right-wing oriented party than the DC 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of both social-democratic and moderately conservative parties. In contrast to this pattern, in Germany the 
position of the CDU has remained fairly stable relative to the position of the average voter while the distance 
between the position of the SPD and that of the median voter has declined. This suggests that only two out of the 
five cases corroborate Kitschelt’s argument that the cartelization is due to the centripetal convergence of SD and 
MC. Furthermore, one should note that while there is some evidence in favor of Kischelt’s systemic-subjective 
cartel party hypothesis, there is almost no evidence for his explanation of the new extreme right parties. Kitschelt 
argues that the NRR are a response or rather a reaction against the centripetal convergence of SD and MC which 
makes the party system under-representative. On the basis of Kitschelt’s theory and of the data just analyzed, one 
should expect a relatively strong new radical right in Germany, the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, and, 
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was), is that there has a been a clear  right-ward shift of each of the party systems under study. 
The important point to be made here is that voters may perceive a right-ward shift of a party 
or a party system even if there has not been one27.  
The perception of the party systems’ right-ward shift is what is supported both by the 
Eurobarometer and, when they were available, by the national election study data. The 
analysis of the Eurobarometer data shows that voters perceive the average party’s position has 
shifted to the right in France, in Germany, in Italy, in the Netherlands and in the United 
Kingdom. All of these party systems are perceived to have noticeably moved right-ward in a 
five year time-span. The Eurobarometer data are presented in Table 8.  
[Table 8 about here] 
The Dutch and the German national survey data allow one to construct time series and 
to check whether the trends observed with the Eurobarometer data denote a long-term right-
ward shift of the West European party system or only a temporary aberration. The Dutch data, 
which cover the 1981-1998 period, show a clear, though not perfectly linear, right-ward shift 
of the Dutch party system. Only in 1989 was the average party’s position to the left of the 
value registered in 1981, while in all of the other cases the average party’s position has been 
to the right of the 1981 value. In any case, the situation depicted by the Dutch election survey 
data is consistent with the picture revealed by the Eurobarometer data, that is that the Dutch 
party system moved right-ward from the late 1980s onward. Similarly, the picture depicted by 
the German election survey data shows that after a period of left-ward movement from the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
conversely a relatively week extreme right in France and in Italy. Electoral returns in each of these countries 
have provided very large evidence of the contrary.  
 
27 In other words, the right-ward shift of a party system may only exist in voters’subjective perception and, be, 
henceforth, entirely subjective.  
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mid-1970s to the early 1980s, the German party system shifted right-ward as suggested by the 
Eurobarometer data. The Dutch and the German data are presented in Table 9.  
[Table 9 about here] 
The Growing Gap Between Parties and Voters 
The analysis of the voters’ self-placement on the left-right scale showed a increasing left-ward 
shift of the West European electorate, with the only exception represented by the Italian 
voters who reported increasingly high levels of right-wingism. At the same time, the analysis 
of parties’ placement on the left-right scale showed that voters perceive an increasing right-
ward shift of Western European party systems. By combining the two sets of data, I come to 
three different findings. First of all, I find that the gap between average voter’s position and 
the perceived position of the party system’s center has increased almost everywhere, with the 
exception of the United Kingdom where the distance between the average voter’s position and 
the perceived center of the party system has declined in absolute terms from -.34 to +.09. 
Second, I find that regardless of whether the perceived distance between parties and voters 
has increased or not in absolute terms, in each of the countries under study party systems are 
perceived to have shifted right-ward. In 1989, the Dutch, the German and the Italian average 
party’s position were perceived to be located on the right of the average voter’s position, 
while both the French and the British average party position were perceived to be located on 
the left of the average voter’s position. By 1994, the average party’s position was perceived to 
be on the right side of the average voter’s position in each of the countries under study. In 
other words, the perception of parties’ tremendous right-ward movement is responsible, in the 
voters’ eyes, for the greater distance between positions and preferences of the electorate and 
those of the parties. This is my third finding. Data are reported in Table 10. 
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[Table 10 about here] 
The Dutch and the German election surveys provide additional evidence with regard 
to the fact that voters perceive that there is an increasing gap between the position of the 
electorate and the position of the party system. Moreover, if, and to the extent that, a position 
on the left-right spectrum is indicative of a policy preference, as was previously remarked, 
then there seems to be an increasing gap between the policy demands of the electorate on the 
one hand and the policy supply of the party system on the other hand. The data reported in 
Table 11 suggest in fact that the gap between the center of the party system and the position 
of the average voter has increased.  
[Table 11 about here] 
Part Three: Conclusions and Reflections 
The major findings presented in this paper are clear. The analysis of the survey data provides 
evidence consistent with my subjective cartel party hypothesis. Western European voters 
perceive that parties have become very similar, and that voters’ political demands are left 
unsatisfied. As I have argued in the course of the paper, the perception of the parties’ 
similarity is justified and/or motivated by the perception of a party system change. However, 
and in contrast to Kitschelt, I have shown that this change is not the centripetal converge of 
the Social-Democratic and Moderately Conservative parties, but it is instead the right-ward 
shift of the whole party system. To repeat my point, voters perceive that the gap between the 
electorate, its position and its policy preferences on the one hand and the party system, its 
position and its policy proposals on the other hand has widened.  
In this paper I have also provided some evidence as to why there is a widening gap 
between the position of the party system and the position of the electorate. Specifically, I have 
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shown that the gap between the average voter position and the party systems’ center is 
widening because of the simultaneous left-ward shift of the electorate and right-ward 
movement of the party systems. Party systems’ right-ward shift was generated by the fact that 
Social-Democratic parties moved right-ward and the repositioning was not always counter-
balanced by an equal left-ward shift of the Moderately Conservative Parties. This provides 
additional evidence as to why I suggested that it is not entirely appropriate to argue that the 
perception of the cartel is generated by the centripetal convergence Social-Democratic and 
Moderately Conservative parties. In Germany the distance between the position of the average 
voter and the position of respectively CDU, the CSU and of the CDU/CSU has remained 
roughly the same. By contrast, the distance between the position of the average voter and that 
of the SPD has diminished by from 2.54 to 1.15. In the Netherlands, both the PvdA and the 
CDA converged toward the average voter position but the PvdA converged toward the 
average voter more markedly than the CDA. In fact the distance between the position of the 
average voter and that of the PvdA has declined by 1.75 from 2.86 in 1981 to just 1.11 in 
1998, while the distance between the position of the average voter and that of the CDA 
diminished by only 1.01 from 1.88 to .087. Data are presented in Table 12. 
[Table 12 about here] 
The second implication concerns the temporal localization of party cartelization. On 
the basis of their systemic approach both Katz and Mair and Blyth and Katz argued that 
parties’ cartelization started in the 1970s, with the crisis of the catch-all party model of party 
organization. Specifically, this is when state contributions became parties’ major source of 
financial resources and when parties abandoned the distributive policies that were 
characteristic of the catch-all party period. Both studies suggest that parties have further 
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cartelized in the following decades. In his criticism of Katz and Mair’s version of the cartel 
party hypothesis, Kitschelt argued that there is little evidence in favor of the systemic theory 
of the cartel, and that the evidence that he finds suggests that while there might have been a 
systemic cartel or cartelizing tendencies in the 1970s, the cartel and/or the cartelizing 
tendencies were no longer there in the 1980s and in 1990s. This is the state of the debate if we 
assume that the systemic approach provides the only analytical framework for the cartel party 
hypothesis. Yet, as was previously argued, this is not the case. 
In fact, on the basis of his systemic-subjective approach, Kitschelt admits that the lack 
of systemic evidence for the cartel, “does not imply, however, that voters have become more 
satisfied with the achievements of political parties as their representatives in the contemporary 
democratic order”28. Now, if parties are perceived as under-representative, if under-
representation means that voters perceive that their political demands are not satisfied by 
parties’ political offer, that is if political offer varies independently of changes in demand in a 
market controlled by a relatively small number of actors, and, finally, if this is an indication of 
cartelization, then all that Kitschelt is saying is that voters might perceive that there is a cartel 
of parties even when parties are actually trying to be or to become more representative. 
Kitschelt’s point is very similar to the one I made before. For the voters, the 1990s are the age 
of the cartel party.  
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 Table 1. Percentage of voters who see no difference between parties. 
Country Year Percentage of voters seeing no 
Difference between parties 
  France 
1997 54.1 
  United Kingdom 
1997 23.4 
  Germany 
1998 41.6 
Source: British data are taken from British Election Survey 1997, German data are taken from  
Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudien 1998, French data are Taken from ICPSR 3138. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Trends in the percentage of voters who do not see any difference  
between parties. United Kingdom, 1983-1997. 
Country Year Percentage of voters seeing no 
Difference between parties 
  United Kingdom 
1983 6.3 
 1987 4.6 
 1992 13.2 
 1997 23.4 
 Source: 1983, 1987, 1992 and 1997 British Election Survey. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Percentage of voters who do not see any difference between parties  
by age groups. France and Germany. 
 
France Germany 
 %              of              N %              of              N 
Young 56.1                              716 46.1                           648 
Middle Age 54.8                            1460 42.3                            1689 
Old 50.7                              759 36.3                              818 
Source: French data are taken from ICPSR 3138, German data are taken from Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudien 
1998. 
 
 
Table 3. Percentage of Voters who locate themselves on the Left-Right Continuum. 
Year France Germany Italy Netherlands United 
Kingdom 
1973 78.3 92.9 82.7 92.6 82.3 
2000 75.3 74.7 66.3 84.2 83.5 
% change -3.0 -18.2 -16.4 -8.4 +1.2 
Source: ICPSR 7330 and ICPSR 3064. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
28Herbert Kitschelt, “Citizens, politicians, and party cartellization: Political representation and the state failure in 
post industrial democarcies”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, 2000, p. 175.  
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Table 4. Changes in the position of the average voter from 1973-2000 in selected countries. 
Year France Germany Italy Netherlands UK 
1973 5.05 5.63 4.68 5.80 5.37 
1976 4.98 5.90 4.62 5.96 6.12 
1977 4.87 6.02 4.24 5.72 5.85 
1978 4.67 5.93 4.32 5.37 5.62 
1979 4.71 5.85 4.32 5.54 5.75 
1980 5.00 5.67 4.74 4.94 5.73 
1981 4.79 5.91 4.50 6.02 5.59 
1982 5.04 5.50 4.63 5.48 5.84 
1983 5.10 5.60 4.65 5.18 5.64 
1984 4.99 5.25 4.58 5.39 5.67 
1985 5.40 5.50 4.65 5.24 5.92 
1986 5.18 5.52 4.70 5.34 5.60 
1987 5.00 5.32 4.66 5.38 5.80 
1988 4.89 5.59 4.80 5.32 5.77 
1989 5.10 5.34 4.49 5.25 5.75 
1990 4.94 5.50 4.65 5.28 5.42 
1991 4.81 5.60 4.80 5.39 5.56 
1992 4.96 5.43 4.66 5.38 5.46 
1993 4.91 5.56 4.75 5.34 5.35 
1994 5.00 5.16 4.69 5.32 5.37 
1995 4.94 5.35 5.02 5.14 5.21 
1996 4.71 5.02 5.03 4.92 5.07 
1997 4.80 5.15 5.45 5.14 5.21 
1998 4.75 5.12 5.20 4.99 5.21 
1999 4.67 4.93 5.27 5.14 5.12 
2000 4.82 5.18 5.37 5.25 5.20 
Source: Data are taken from the following surveys: ICPSR 7330, ICPSR 7511, ICPSR 7612, ICPSR 7728, 
ICPSR 7728, ICPSR 7957, ICPSR 9022, ICPSR 9057, ICPSR 8234, ICPSR 8364, ICPSR 8513, ICPSR 8680, 
ICPSR 9082, ICPSR 9321, ICPSR 9360, ICPSR 9576, ICPSR 9771, ICPSR 6044, ICPSR 6045,ICPSR 6195, 
ICPSR 3014, ICPSR 661, ICPSR 2443, ICPSR 2088, ICPSR 2831, ICPSR 2864, ICPSR 3064. 
 
Table 5. National Survey Data: the changing position of the German and Dutch average voters. 
Year German median  
Voter’ s  position 
Year Dutch median  
Voter’s position 
1976 6.29 1981 5.75 
1980 6.31 1982 5.60 
1983 6.19 1986 5.51 
1987 6.24 1989 5.42 
1990 6.08 1994 5.41 
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1998 5.25 1998 5.36 
Source: 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1998 Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudien; the Dutch  
data for the 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998 elections were taken respectively from the  
following ICPSR surveys 7912, 8121, 8876, 9950, 6740 and 2836. 
 
Table 6a. Changes in Polarization, 1989-1994. 
Country Polarization in 1989 Polarization in 1994 Change 
France 7.32 7.42 +.10 
Germany 5.90 5.53 -.37 
Italy 6.60 6.93 +.33 
The Netherlands 5.20 5.67 +.47 
United Kingdom 4.93 3.91 -1.02 
Source: The 1989 data are taken from the ICPSR 9360, 1994 data were taken from ICPSR 3014. 
 
Table 6b. Ideological Polarization in Germany and the Netherlands. Time Series. 
Year Polarization of the German 
Party System 
Year Polarization of the Dutch 
Party System 
 
1976 5.00 1981 6.39 
1980 4.51 1982 6.64 
1983 5.43 1986 6.28 
1987 6.15 1989 5.82 
1990 6.45 1994 5.49 
1998 6.98 1998 5.45 
 
Table 7. Changes in the Distance between Social Democratic and Moderately Conservative Parties, 1989-1994. 
Country Distance in 1989 
 
Distance in 1994 Change 
France  4.43 4.83 +.40 
Germany  3.28 2.83 -.45 
Italy 4.46 5.09 +.63 
The Netherlands 3.44 3.29 -.15 
United Kingdom 4.93 3.91 -1.02 
Source: The 1989 data are taken from ICPSR 9360, the 1994 data were taken from ICPSR 3014. 
 
Table 8. Changes in the Position of the Party System’s Center, 1989-1994. 
Country Position in 1989 
 
Position in 1994 Change 
France  4.91 5.27 +.36 
Germany  5.65 5.98 +.33 
Italy 4.87 5.13 +.26 
The Netherlands 5.64 6.04 +.40 
United Kingdom 5.41 5.46 +.05 
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Source: The 1989 data are taken from ICPSR 9360, the 1994 data were taken from ICPSR 3014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Location of the Party System’s Center in Germany (1976-1998) and the Netherlands (1981-1998). 
Germany The Netherlands 
Year Position of the  
Average Party Position 
Year Position of the  
Average Party Position 
1976 6.69 1981 5.13 
1980 6.27 1982 5.81 
1983 6.45 1986 5.56 
1987 6.26 1989 5.04 
1990 6.74 1994 6.18 
1998 6.63 1998 5.84 
Source: Source: 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1998 Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudiesn; the Dutch data for 
the 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 and 1998 elections were taken respectively from the following  ICPSR surveys 
7912, 8121, 8876, 9950, 6740 and 2836. 
 
 
Table 10. Changes in the Distance between the Position of the  
Average Voter and the Position of the Average Party, 1989-1994. 
Country Distance in 1989 Distance in 1994 
France -.19 +.27 
Germany +.31 +.82 
Italy +.38 +.44 
The Netherlands +.40 +.72 
United Kingdom -.34 +.09 
Source: The 1989 data are taken from ICPSR 9360, the 1994 data were taken  
from ICPSR 3014. 
 
 
Table 11. Changes in the Distance between the Position of the Average voter and the Location of the Party 
System’s Center in Germany (1976-1998) and the Netherlands (1981-1998). 
Germany The Netherlands 
Year Distance Year Distance 
1976 +.40 1981 -.62 
1980 -.04 1982 +.21 
1983 +.26 1986 +.05 
1987 +.02 1989 -.38 
1990 +.66 1994 +.77 
1998 +1.38 1998 +.48 
Source: 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1998 Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudien; the Dutch data for the 1981, 
1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 And 1998 elections were taken respectively from the following  ICPSR surveys 7912, 
8121, 8876, 9950, 6740 and 2836. 
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Table 12. Perceived Centripetal Convergence of Social-Democratic and Moderately Conservative Parties. 
a) The Netherlands 
Year Pvda Average voter Cda Distance 
between Pvda 
and Average 
voter 
Distance 
between CDA 
and Average 
voter 
1981 2.89 5.75 7.63 2.86 1.88 
1982 2.98 5.60 7.57 2.62 1.97 
1986 2.66 5.51 7.61 2.85 2.10 
1989 3.10 5.42 7.02 2.32 1.60 
1994 3.72 5.41 6.45 1.69 1.04 
1998 4.25 5.36 6.23 1.11 .87 
 
 
b) Germany 
 
Year SPD Average 
voter 
CDU CSU CDU/ 
CSU 
Distance 
between 
the SPD 
and 
Average 
voter 
Distance 
between 
CDU and 
Average 
voter 
Distance 
between 
CSU and 
Average 
voter 
Distance 
between 
CDU/ 
CSU and  
Average 
voter 
1976 3.75 6.29 8.35 9.15 8.75 2.54 2.06 2.86 2.46 
1980 4.31 6.31 8.22 9.01 8.62 2.00 1.91 2.70 2.31 
1983 4.21 6.19 8.46 9.17 8.82 1.98 2.27 2.98 2.63 
1987 3.98 6.24 8.43 9.13 8.78 2.26 2.19 2.89 2.54 
1990 4.14 6.08 8.12 8.88 8.50 1.94 2.04 2.80 2.42 
1998 4.10 5.25 7.32 8.16 7.74 1.15 2.07 2.91 2.49 
Source: Source: Source: 1976, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990 and 1998 Deutsche Nationale Wahlstudien; the Dutch 
data for the 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994 And 1998 elections were taken respectively from the following  
ICPSR surveys 7912, 8121, 8876, 9950, 6740 and 2836. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
